Architectural de nition often begins with a very highlevel architectural description, e.g., speci cation of data ow among a few abstract components. This highlevel description is then re ned in order to ultimately achieve a much more detailed description that can be implemented directly. On the other hand, with the advent of the object-oriented paradigm, architectural denition can consist of assembling a collection of standard components and connectors. But, if such an assemblage is complex, it is desirable to generate more abstract descriptions from it, in order to facilitate understanding and analysis. In either case, the end product of the architecting process is an architectural hierarchy, a collection of architectural descriptions linked by mappings that interpret the more abstract descriptions in the more concrete descriptions.
Formalized transformational approaches to architecture re nement and abstraction have been proposed. One argument in favor of formalization is that it can result in architectural implementations that are guaranteed to be correct, relative to the abstract descriptions. If an abstract description and an implementation are correct with respect to one another, conclusions obtained by reasoning from an abstract architectural description will apply to the implemented architecture as well. But this correctness guarantee is achieved by requiring that the implementor use only veri ed transformations, i.e., transformations that have been proven to produce correct results whenever they are applied.
This paper explores an approach to allowing the implementor the freedom to use transformations that have not been proven to be generally correct, without voiding the correctness guarantee. Checking means determining that application of the transformation produced the desired result by performing a straightforward calculation of some sort. Checking allows the use of transformations that have not been generally veri ed, even transformations that are known to sometimes produce incorrect results, by showing that they work in the particular case.
Our initial approach to checking, inspired by Necula and Lee's work on certifying compilers, involves checking that these non-veri ed transformation steps preserve proofs of the critical properties of interest, such as system security. This approach will be illustrated by an example drawn from our research on architectures for secure distributed transaction processsing. Other approaches, useful for checking that broad classes of properties are preserved by the transformation step, are also being investigated.
Although the primary objective of this work is to allow the architect greater exibility in correctly implementing abstract architectures and generating accurate abstract views of architectures, it has other bene ts as well. For example, because veri cation is a more complex and error-prone process than checking, a combination of veri cation and checking particular re nement steps can substantially increase con dence that an abstract description correctly characterizes an implementation.
Introduction
The process of specifying an architecture often begins by providing a very high-level description of it. This description characterizes the architecture in terms of a few abstract components, perhaps the principal functions the system must perform and some data stores. These components are linked by abstract connectors, perhaps indicating data ow or control ow relationships among the components. This abstract description provides an easily understood overview of the entire system architecture, but omits so much detail that it provides relatively little guidance to someone charged with implementing the architecture using programming language level and operating system level constructs. So the abstract description must be successively re ned | with complex components and connectors decomposed into simpler parts, and abstract speci cations of operations and relationships replaced by more concrete speci cations | until an appropriate amount of detail has been added. It usually is desirable to continue the re nement until implementation-level constructs have replaced all the abstractions.
Alternatively, architecting a system can consist of assembling instances of reusable component and connector types selected from a library. Such libraries e ectively make implementation-level more abstract, and reduce the conceptual gap between the requirements speci cation and the implemented architecture. Nevertheless, combining a large number of components and connectors in complex ways can easily result in an architecture that is hard to understand and analyze. So, it is desirable to generate more easily comprehensible abstract representations of the implementation-level architecture.
In either case, the end product of the architecting process is typically a collection of architectural descriptions, at di erent levels of abstraction and often in different styles 5]. The more abstract descriptions are linked to the more concrete descriptions by interpretation mappings. An interpretation mapping says how the abstractions are implemented. 1 It sends each sentence in the language of the abstract description to a corresponding sentence in the language of the concrete description. For example, the fact that some component a is implemented by components a 1 ; a 2 ; : : : ; a n would be indicated by mapping the sentence Component(a) to the sentence Component(a 1 ) ∧ Component(a 2 ) ∧ : : : ∧ Component(a n ) The collection of architectural descriptions and interpretation mappings that comprise the complete architectural speci cation is called an architecture hierarchy.
There are many advantages to formalizing re nement and abstraction in system development: a library of renement or abstraction transformations provides a \cor-porate knowledge base" of standard, or preferred, development patterns; mechanizing the application of these transformations lessens the likelihood of clerical errors during the development process; reuse of the transformations will result in greater validation of the patterns they codify; and so on. But one of the most fundamental advantages of formalization is that it allows the average developer to produce abstraction hierarchies that are guaranteed to be consistent. In other words, the use of veri ed transformations in the development process will guarantee that abstractions accurately characterize implementations, albeit more abstractly. A veri ed renement transformation is one that has been proven to produce a correct implementation of whatever it is applied to. A veri ed abstraction transformation is one 1 For more details on characterizing implementation steps using interpretation mappings, see our earlier paper 12] . that has been proven to produce a correct abstraction of whatever it is applied to.
Even if attention is restricted to the case of architectures, there is some debate as to exactly what correct should mean. We have proposed a somewhat stricter than usual criterion for correctness 12], while others have argued that the standard criterion is preferable 19]. For present purposes, any reasonable criterion that characterizes correctness in terms of preservation of truth will do perfectly well. The standard correctness criterion is that every consequence of the abstract description must be a consequence of the concrete description as well. More precisely, for every sentence A in the language of the abstract description,
where T 1 is the logical theory that formalizes the abstract description, T 2 is the theory that formalizes the concrete description, and is the interpretation mapping that links the two theories. 2 A mapping that satis es this condition is called an interpretation of T 1 in T 2 . Our proposed stronger criterion for purely structural descriptions replaces the conditional with a biconditional, i.e., requires that the interpretation mapping be a faithful theory interpretation. One might also employ weaker-than-standard criteria, where only some consequences of the theory | properties of special interest | need be preserved.
What all these criteria have in common is that they justify the use of formal reasoning about the architecture based on the more abstract descriptions. If some sentence is shown to be a formal consequence of the abstract architectural theory, the concrete theory is known to correctly implement the abstract theory, and the sentence is among those that the correctness criterion guarantees are preserved by the implementation, then the sentence is known to be a consequence of the concrete theory as well. It is correctness guarantees that link the results of abstract analyses to the real world.
The usual approach to producing a correctness guarantee is restricting the architect to the use of veri ed transformations. This approach su ers from a problem, in practice. Even given a fairly mature library of veried transformations, it would hardly be surprising if an architect found himself unable to perform a certain renement or abstraction step that he believed to be correct because the required transformation has not been included in the library. Expecting the typical system architect to produce a formal proof that the step is correct is unrealistic, yet the presence of a single unveri ed implementation step in the hierarchy voids the correct-ness guarantee provided by the restriction to veri ed transformations. Is there any way to allow the user to include such arbitrary steps in the development of the architecture hierarchy, while maintaining a correctness guarantee?
2 Proof-carrying architectures Our solution to this problem is based on the notion of checking the correctness of steps in architecture hierarchy development. By checking, I mean automatically performing some calculation that shows the step is correct. Checking can be substantially simpler than verication, because it is focussed on a particular step. Verifying a transformation means showing that it always produces correct results, while check a transformation step means showing that a correct result was obtained in one speci c case. Thus, checking entirely avoids the sometimes di cult problem of characterizing the preconditions required for the transformation to produce correct results 21].
Our initial approach to checking transformation steps was inspired work by George Necula and Peter Lee on compilers that generate proof-carrying code (PCC) 15]. Their basic idea is that, rather than attempting to prove the transformations performed by a compiler always produce code with certain desired properties, to generate a purported formal proof that the complied code has those properties as part of the code generation process. The purported proof can then be checked and, if it turns out to be a correct proof, it follows that the generated code has the desired properties. Thus, the emphasis is shifted from showing that compiler transformations are correct in general to checking that they produced correct results in individual cases.
The application of this idea to architectural transformation is straightforward. At some abstract level, the architectural description is proven to guarantee that the architecture has some desirable property, C. The interpretation mapping that sends abstract level sentences to their implementations can also be applied to the proof of C. If the image of the proof under the implementation mapping turns out to be a correct proof that the implementation has (C), then, of course, the implementation has (C). Checking the transformed proof can, therefore, provide the desired correctness guarantee. The primary result of our development e orts is a hierarchy that links an extremely abstract architectural description, shown in Fig. 1 , to three implementation-level descriptions written in a style that can be directly translated into a programming language such as Java using standard network programming constructs. The gap between the abstract SDTP architecture and each concrete SDTP architectures is lled by roughly two dozen | the exact number varies among the implementations | descriptions at intermediate levels of abstraction, linked in a chain by interpretation mappings. We are in the process of formally proving the implementation-level architectures secure by proving that the abstract description is secure, and proving that every interpretation mapping preserves security. One of the techniques that is being employed is showing that the interpretations incrementally transform the abstract-level security proof into implementation-level security proofs. The example below shows how the interpretation mapping associated with the rst re nement step in all three chains transforms the abstract security proof into a slightly more concrete security proof.
3.1 The abstract SDTP architecture The boxes are the components of the architecture: the Application (labeled \ap"), some number of Resource Managers (labeled \rm"), and a Transaction Manager (labeled \tm"). The components are linked by secure channels, indicated by the heavy doubleheaded arrows that make up the interfaces between the Application and Resource Managers, the Application and the Transaction Manager, and the Resource Managers and the Transaction Manager. Secure channels are a type of connector that enforce the security policy. In other words, secure channels will not carry classi ed data from a component to a component that lacks required clearances. To say that the system as a whole satis es the security policy means that there is no ow of classi ed data to a component that lacks the required clearances.
An abstract proof of security
Informally, the security of the system follows almost immediately from the the fact that it employs only secure channels 13]. Not surprisingly, a textbook-style natural deduction proof 8, 10] of system security is quite simple. 3 Consider the data ow from some given Resource Manager rm to the Application ap, for example. A proof of the formula (8d : Labeled Data) Flows(d; rm; ap)
which says every labeled datum d that ows from rm to ap has a security label classifying it that is less than or equal to the clearance level of ap from ve axioms of the architectural theory is shown in Fig. 2 . The ve axioms say 1. every labeled datum d that ows from rm to ap is carried by secure ar channel from the output port rm's ar port to the input port of the port array ap's ar ports that is indexed by rm, 2. the input port of the port array ap's ar ports that is indexed by rm is a port of ap, 3. if secure channel c carries labeled datum d from output port x to input port y, then d's security label is less than or equal to the clearance level of y, 4. the clearance level of any port y of component a must be less than or equal to the clearance level of a, and 5. the ordering of security labels is transitive. The rst two axioms are facts about the particular architecture, the third axiom is the de ning property of the secure channel subtype, the fourth and fth axioms are general axioms of the security model.
A slightly more concrete SDTP architecture
The secure channels of abstract SDTP architecture can be implemented in terms of ordinary data ow channels and additional components in a variety of ways, depending upon the security properties of the components 13]. 3 In this paper, I will use natural deduction, since that provides a familiar concrete representation of formal proofs. In our actual veri cations that the SDTP hierarchy's interpretation steps preserve security, we are employing the PVS veri cation system 18]. The most interesting implementation is shown in Fig. 3 , where the light doubleheaded arrows represent ordinary data ow channels that do not enforce the security policy. This implementation is suited to the case where all of the resource managers are single-level, but not necessarily the same level. The security policy is enforced by a multi-level secure component that lters data ow between the application and the resource managers: if passing a datum from a resource manager to the application would violate the security policy, the lter removes it from the stream. The concrete architecture can be thought of as resulting from the abstract architecture by applying several transformations. For example, one transformation, the Filter Introduction Transformation (FIT), replaces secure channels between components that are not multilevel secure by ordinary data ow channels and a component that enforces the security policy.
3.4 A slightly more concrete proof of security Now it must be shown that, like the abstract SDTP architecture, the more concrete SDTP architecture has the desired security property. The two conventional approachs to establishing this result are 1. to directly prove that the more concrete architecture is secure, in much the same way the the abstract architecture was proven secure (perhaps using the abstract-level proof for heuristic guidance), and 2. to show that the Filter Introduction Transformation (FIT), and the other transformations that produce the more concrete architecture from the ab- Universal generalization (13) Figure 2 : Formal proof that data ow from rm to ap satis es the security policy stract architecture, always preserves the security propery. The use of proof-carrying architectures provides a third alternative.
When transformation FIT is applied, it can be applied not only to the architectural description, but to the formal security proof of Fig. 2 as well. The result of applying FIT to this proof is shown in Fig. 4 , where the implementation mapping associated with this application is determined as follows. A complete account of how rst-order interpretation mappings are de ned, and basic facts about them, can be found in the logic textbooks of Enderton 4] and Shoen eld 22], among others. 4 For present purposes, it is enough to know that that is mentioned in formulas 1, 3, 6, and 7 of the abstract-level proof is mapped to a conjunction of the Carries, Passes, and Carries predicates, Carries(hchanneli, hdatumi, hout porti, h lter in porti)
∧ Passes(h lteri, hdatumi, h lter in porti, h lter out porti) ∧ Carries(hchanneli, hdatumi, h lter out porti, hin porti)
This clause in the de nition of says that a secure channel carrying a datum from some output port to some input port is implemented as a channel carrying the datum from the output port to some input port of a lter, passing the datum through the lter from the input port to some output port, and carrying the datum from output port of the lter to the input port. 5 This mapping is also applied to formula 3 in order to preserve the fact that formula 7 should follow from formula 3 by Universal Instantiation. It is easy to check that the result of applying the FIT interpretation mapping to the proof of security is a syntactically correct derivation of the desired security property from formulas that are images of axioms of the more abstract architectural theory. Mapping sends tautological consequence steps to correct tautological consequence steps, universal instantiation steps to correct universal instantiation steps, and universal generalization steps to correct universal generalization steps. So has indeed mapped the formal abstractlevel security proof to a concrete-level security proof, but not necessarily a proof from axioms of the concrete architectural theory.
Completing the proof
The image of the rst axiom under says that every labeled datum that ows from rm to ap is carried to the lter from rm, passed through the lter, and then carried to ap from the lter. Just as in the case of the rst axiom, this is a fact about the particular architecture that is either an axiom of the concrete theory, or easily and automatically derivable from axioms of the concrete theory. The mapping leaves the second axiom unchanged. This will certainly be an axiom of the concrete theory, as well as the abstract theory. The image of the third axiom is a bit more complex. It states that the combination of the two channels and the lter enforces the security property. It is quite unlikely that this would be among the chosen axioms of the concrete level theory, since it is the lter alone, e ectively, that is enforcing security. Still, it is easy to see that this formula must be a consequence of axioms of the concrete theory: the security model requires that channels which do not enforce security can only connect ports with matching clearances, and one of the de ning properties of an MLS component is that it only supplies data at an output port if the classi cation of the data is less than ot equal to the clearance of the port. A formalization of this proof from particular axioms we use in the SDTP security veri cation is shown in Fig. 5 . Discovery of this proof is easy. The form of the desired conclusion | a conjunction of conditions on Carries and Passes in the antecedent, and the comparison of label to clearance in the consequent | immediately suggests the use of the axioms on lines 1 and 2 of the proof. So it should be quite plausible that the proof can be discovered without human intervention by the transformation system. The interpretation mapping does not a ect the images of the remaining two axioms; they remain general axioms of the security model. So, by combining the proof in Fig. 5 with the proof in Fig. 4 , we obtain a proof of the security property from axioms of the concrete theory. Moreover, this proof is recognizably a formalization of our informal argument 13, p. 89] that the concrete architecture satis es the security policy. 4 Generalizing from the example
The idea of using the architectural transformation to transform the proof that the more abstract architecture has a desired property into a proof that the more concrete architecture has the property worked well for this rather simple, but real-world, example. Is there any reason to believe that it will work equally well in other cases? Recall that the standard criterion for correctness of a implementation mapping of an abstract logical theory T 1 in a more concrete theory T 2 is that must interpret T 1 in T 2 , i.e., it must be the case that, for every formula A in the language of T 1 ,
If interprets T 1 in T 2 , an easy inductive argument shows that maps formal proofs from T 1 to formal proofs from T 1 ] that can be extended to proofs from T 2 . If A is an axiom of T 1 , then, since is a theory interpretation, (A) is derivable from T 2 . Because is de ned so that connectives pass through it, maps tautological consequence steps to tautological consequence steps. Similarly, maps universal instantiation and universal generalization steps to universal instantiation and generalization steps, respectively. Thus, maps formal proofs from abstract axioms to formal proofs from images of abstract axioms, and images of abstract axioms . . .
Taut. (n, n + m ) . . . can always be proved from concrete axioms, as shown in Fig. 6 . So, if an architectural transformation step is correct, in the standard sense, the corresponding interpretation mapping will map formal proofs to formal proofs containing gaps that can be lled. A fortiori, an abstractlevel formal proof of some particular property of interest | say, satisfaction of a security policy | will be mapped to a proof that the implementation also has (the implementation-level analogue of) the property. Since the replacement of the secure channel from rm to ap by a pair of channels and a lter is evidently correct, it is not surprising that the FIT mapping sends the abstractlevel security proof to a concrete-level security proof.
It follows that the proof-carrying architecture approach allows the architect to perform arbitrary correct transformations when implementing an abstract architecture, provided the transformation system that supports the approach is clever enough to nd the proofs of images of axioms. The question remains: In general, how hard is it to discover these proofs? In our experience, it invariably quite easy, because we deal with re nement patterns that make only small changes in representation of the architecture. Indeed, the example in Fig. 5 is representative of the complexity of most of these proofs. At lower levels in the SDTP hierarchy, there are more gaps to be lled in | because lower-level architectural theories are more complex, and proofs are based on a larger number of axioms | but the size of the gaps is about the same. We are con dent that considerable automated support for nding proofs to ll the gaps can be provided.
Finally, it should be noted that incorrect transformations that happen to preserve the proof of the property of interest will also be judged acceptable on the proofcarrying architectures approach. Therefore, it is wellsuited to the case where the focus is on obtaining an implementation with some particular desirable property | i.e., when a weaker-than-usual correctness criterion is adequate | and placing minimal constraints on the architect's implementation options is preferred, as is the case in SDTP.
Related work
Although there is a large and growing literature on formal software transformation, nearly all of it is oriented toward maintaining functional correctness, rather than system structure. Similarly, there is a large body of literature on architectural re nement and composition, nearly all of it employing semiformal representation and analysis techniques, at best. , and Moriconi and Qian 11] on formally representing the semantics of connectors and relating semantic models at di erent levels of abstraction. But, the emphasis in all these cases has always been on veri cation of general re nement patterns, rather than checking particular steps. Necula and Lee's work on proof-carrying code and its applications 15, 16, 17] introduced the notion of replacing veri cation by checking in the context of compilation. The work described in this paper can be viewed as generalizing their ideas about code re nement transformations to architectural transformations, both re nements and abstractions. 6 
Conclusions
Transformational development of architectures can guarantee that implementations are correct by restricting the architect to a stock of veri ed transformations. But such a correctness guarantee is quite brittle, since use of a single non-veri ed transformation voids it. Moreover, if many transformations are used, and the veri cation of each is di cult, then con dence in the correctness of the implementation may be less than desired. Checking particular re nement steps o ers a way of allowing the architect greater freedom, and of achieving higher levels of con dence that the implemented architecture has the desired properties.
Our initial approach to checking, based on the idea of proof-carrying architectures, is especially well suited to the case where the main requirement is high condence that the implementation has some speci c property. The property is shown to hold at some abstract level, and every re nement is produced by application of a transformation known to preserve the property, or is checked for correctness by making sure that the transformation preserves the proof of the desired property, or both.
The main limitation of this rst approach to checking is that properties are checked one-at-a-time. We are exploring other approaches to checking that allow an entire class of properties to be checked at once. One that seems particularly promising is based on the idea of applying the simpli ed technique for proving implementation mapping correctness 20] to development steps at architecture de nition-time. This complementary approach to checking will allow the correctness of steps to be checked, relative to our strong correctness criterion, rather than checking one or a few properties of interest. But it can be applied only to complete architectural descriptions of single structures, not to descriptions of varied families of architectural structures. The proofchecking architectures approach applies equally well to descriptions of single structures and descriptions of families.
As mentioned above, our preliminary experiments with proof-carrying architecture are being performed with the PVS veri cation system 18]. Improved support for working with proof-carrying architectures, including automated discovery of the gap-lling proofs, is being implemented as part of the Xform 6 system, an enhanced version of our present architectural correct-
